I don't think most mathematicians, engineers, and scientists would find notions of responsibility to be intuitive at all, as Mr. Ellerman points out,
>The natural sciences take no note of responsibility. The notion of responsibility (as opposed to causality) is not a concept of physics and engineering. The difference between the responsible actions of persons and the nonresponsible services of things would not be revealed by a simple engineering description of the causal consequences of the actions/services. Therefore when economists choose to restrict their description of the production process to an engineering production function, they are implicitly or explicitly deciding to ignore the difference between the actions of persons and the services of things.
David Ellerman has a point. In math, physics, and engineering, we don't deal with responsibility, only the causality of inanimate objects.
In fact, earlier in the course when we went over preimages of subsets, and I asked if responsibility could be modeled as a sort of preimage operation on a function from a set of **people** to a set of outcomes of their actions (given a specific time), and you confirmed that giving semantics to responsibility in terms of a preimage operation is *technically* possible.
To us, it was no big deal and we moved on, but to someone like a lawyer, the idea that math (what most people think of as "just number manipulation"), can be used to give formal semantics to something as abstract as assigning responsibility, must be mindblowing.